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NOTES

A PROPOSED REGIME FOR COPYRIGHT
PROTECTION ON THE INTERNET
I. INTRODUCTION

The future of telecommunications has arrived, and it goes
by many names. Call it "cyberspace,"' cyberia, the information
superhighway, the Internet, the "Net," or any other name you
think applicable,2 but its recent explosive growth has sent a
clear message. One computer consultant interviewed in 1994
said, "If you're not an active Internet citizen by the mid1990's, you're likely to be out of business by the year 2000."'
While the number of users both nationally and internationally
is skyrocketing, and the amount of available information
increases daily, copyright infringement is rampant. Estimates
have placed the amount of money lost each year to copyright
infringement on the Internet in the range of tens of billions of
dollars.4 Copyright experts around the world are debating,
discussing, conferencing, writing, and publishing their views
on the direction that copyright law must take to meet the
challenges posed by this new mode of communication.'
1. Cyberspace is a term coined by science fiction writer William Gibson to
describe the virtual space created by the interconnection of computers. WILIAM
GIBSON, NEUROMANCER 51 (1984).
2. Although technically incorrect, I will use the term "Internet" as a catchall
to refer to the global network of computers that is revolutionizing the way in
which people around the world communicate with each other.
3. Patricia B. Seybold, a computer consultant, is reported to have made this
statement in Computerworld, an industry publication. See Peter H. Lewis, Getting
Down to Business on the Net, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 1994, §3, at 1, 1.
4. Marc S. Friedman et al., Infojacking: Crimes on the Information
Superhighway, N.J. L.J., May 22, 1995, at S-2.
5. See The Information Tidal Wave: Issues and Challenges, 13 No. 1 ACCA
Docket 10 (Jan.-Feb. 1995), available in Westlaw, ACCADKT Database [hereinafter
Information Tidal Wave] (edited transcript of a closed roundtable discussion held
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Governments around the world are scurrying to conduct
studies and issue reports,6 yet no consensus has emerged.'
The only thing that can be agreed upon, at least by some
copyright commentators, is that technology has once again
outpaced the effectiveness of the world's current laws.8 The
looming question is: How will the law respond to this
challenge?9
This Note suggests an international regime for the
copyright protection of digitized works which draws on models
of regulation found in other industries that have been faced
with similar problems. Part II addresses the nature of the
dilemma facing legislators as they attempt to adapt copyright
law to this new technology. Further, Part II explores the
policies and conflicts surrounding copyright law generally, the
reasons that the Internet specifically needs to be governed by a
viable copyright regime, and the unique challenges that first
must be overcome if a viable copyright regime is to be
established. Part HI examines how other industries have dealt
with some of the same problems that are facing the Internet
today. First, Part III focuses on compulsory licensing as a form
of regulation generally. Second, Part III examines how
compulsory licensing has been used in the United States to
regulate copyright royalties in the cable and satellite television
industries. Finally, the section observes how royalty
remuneration functions in the music industry with regard to

in conjunction with the American Corporate Counsel Association's Tenth Annual
Meeting in San Francisco in October 1994); see also John Markoff, Unraveling
Copyright Rules for Cyberspace, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 1995, at D18.
6. For the report issued by the United States government, see BRUCE A.
LEHMAN

& RONALD

H. BROWN,

INFORMATION

INFRASTRUCTURE

TASK FORCE,

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: THE
REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (1995)

[hereinafter NII REPORT].
7. See Michael D. McCoy & Needham J. Boddie, II, Cybertheft: Will
Copyright Law Prevent Digital Tyranny on the Superhighway?, 30 WAKE FOREST L.
REv. 169, 172-73 (1995).
8. Information Tidal Wave, supra note 5, at *18, *24; Kenneth D. Salomon &
Michael J. Pierce, Copyright Law and the Information Highway, 96 EDUC. L. REP.
315, 315 (1995); Robert L. Dunne, Deterring Unauthorized Access to Computers:
Controlling Behavior in Cyberspace Through a Contract Law Paradigm, 35
JURmETRICS J. 1, 15 (1994).

9. See Don E. Tomlinson, Journalism and Entertainment as Intellectual
Property on the Information Superhighway: The Challenge of the Digital Domain, 6
STAN. L. & POLY REv. 61, 62 (1994).
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the licensing of public performing rights. Within this context,
royalty collection societies in the United States and Europe
and blanket licensing will be examined.
Part IV compares the cable and satellite television
industries and the music industry to the Internet and
determines that because of the Internet's similarity to these
industries, certain aspects of the regulation used in each
industry are feasible for the Internet. In Part V, a working
copyright model combining aspects of both the cable and
satellite television industries and the music industries is
proposed. Finally, in Part VI, this Note argues that although
the proposed regime will not put an end to copyright
infringement of Internet-disseminated material, as long as
certain definitional difficulties can be overcome, it is possible
to strike a workable balance between providing for the
economic rights of copyright holders, and decreasing the
prohibitive transaction costs involved in forcing on-line
networks to contact individually every copyright holder whose
work they wanted to access.' ° Many writers in the United
States have explored the possibility of compulsory licensing for
works disseminated on the Internet, but few have been in
favor of the idea, and those that were in favor of it have only
explored the possibility of instituting some type of compulsory
licensing scheme in the United States." Other writers have
discussed the possibility of instituting a collection system
similar to that of the music industry, 2 but again, only in

10. See generally Jessica IAtman, The Exclusive Right to Read, 13 CARDOZO
ARTs & ENT. L.J. 29 (1994).
11. See, e.g., Information Tidal Wave, supra note 5, at *17 ("Perhaps

something

like compulsory licensing is

on the horizon.").

Indeed, another

commentator noted, "I'm not sure how the information superhighway can be

successfully implemented without it." Id. at *18. "[Clopyright should respond to
instantaneous digital copying by...

compulsory

instituting for every work a system of

licensing of limited duration." Ron Coleman,

Copycats on the

Superhighway, 81 A.B.A. J. 68, 70 (1995).
12. Henry H. Perritt, Jr., President Clinton's National Information
Infrastructure Initiative: Community Regained? 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 991, 1004
(1994) (arguing that "[sluch electronic intellectual property enforcement could be
modeled on music industry institutions that enforce phonograph recording
copyrights in bars and other places of public entertainment."); Ilene K- Gotts &
Alan D. Rutenberg, Navigating the Global Information Superhighway: A Bumpy
Road Lies Ahead, 8 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 275, 319 (1995) (suggesting that
"[p]erhaps a fee mechanism, such as BMI and ASCAP perform for musical
recordings, could be designed to provide remuneration to copyright owners.");
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terms of U.S. regulation. This Note explores the possibility of
having a pseudo-compulsory licensing regime, along with
royalty collection clearinghouses which are designed to
transcend national boundaries, much like the medium that
they would be regulating.
II. NATURE OF THE DILEMMA
A. Policies and Conflicts Surrounding Copyright Law
It has been widely recognized by copyright commentators
that there are tensions between the "authors" who want to be
compensated for the works they produce and the public's
interest in unfettered access to these works.13 It is important
for the public to have access to creative endeavors, but if these
works are going to exist at all, authors need some type of
incentive to produce. 4 This tension has been embodied in a
copyright regime around the world which attempts to reconcile
these two competing interests by allowing the public to have
access to copyrighted work, while simultaneously providing a
system which affords limited protection to the creators. 5 The
premise behind this type of regime lies in the fact that without
this protection, creators would not create and society as a
Information Tidal Wave, supra note 5, at *18 (where one member of the panel
discussion noted: "I really am in favor of a royalty collection system similar to
what happens with music licensing. I think that's probably the best way to give
the owners of the intellectual property fair return and still not waste tremendous
effort trying to police something that is virtually impossible to police anyway.").
13. McCoy & Boddie, supra note 7, at 175.
14. Id. at 175-76.
15. This international copyright regime is centered around two major copyright
treaties. The first is the Berne Convention, initially adopted by nations in 1886.
Convention for the Creation of an Intellectual Union for the Protection of Literary
and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, 168 Consol. T.S. 185. Since its inception, this
convention has been subject to six revisions. Alan M. Fisch, Compulsory Licensing
of Blacked-Out Professional Team Sporting Event Telecasts (PTSETS): Using
Copyright Law to Mitigate Monopolistic Behavior, 32 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 403, 415
n.84 (1995). The most recent revision occurred in Paris in 1971. Berne Convention
for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, July 24, 1971, S. TREATY DOc.
No. 27, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1986), 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne
Convention]. The United States resisted adopting the Berne Convention for many
years, but finally became a member with the enactment of the Berne Convention
Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988) (codified
in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
The second treaty is the Universal Copyright Convention, Sept. 6, 1952, 6
U.S.T. 2731, 216 U.N.T.S. 132, revised July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 943 U.N.T.S.
178.
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whole would suffer because it would not have access to creative
endeavors. 6
The tension between public access to copyrighted works
and a copyright holder's remuneration for those works has
climaxed, and, for the most part, remains unresolved due to
the recent explosive growth of the Internet. The Internet's
purpose, dating from its inception in the 1960s,' 7 was the free
flow of ideas and the purposeful creation of a pool of shared
knowledge and information. This is the polar opposite of a
copyright law whose purpose is to protect copyright holders'
rights in the dissemination of their works and to prevent the
works from "flowing freely." _ -2
B. Why The Internet Needs to be Governed by a Viable
Copyright Regime
While the spirit in which the Internet was conceived
should be realized, the medium cannot survive indefinitely
without some type of copyright protection for authors. The
existing copyright regime, however, originally created for
works in print, will not be effective. 8 New laws must be
created that can control a medium which has been
affectionately dubbed "The Wild West." 9 The fact that
developing and implementing a workable regime will be
extremely difficult does not in any way lessen the urgency or
the necessity of such a regime." There is too much money in
16. Patrick Murphy, Note, Retransmission Consent: A Mixed Signal for Cable
Copyright, 17 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 237, 256 (1994).
17. The Internet began as the Advanced Research Projects Agency Network
(ARPAnet), an experimental computer network. ARPAnet was an integral portion
of a larger plan to guarantee contact and communication between strategic sites in
the event that the United States was involved in a nuclear war and other
methods of communication were unavailable or unsafe. See generally Robert F.
Goldman, Note, Put Another Log on the Fire, There's a Chill on the Internet: The
Effect of Applying Current Anti-Obscenity Laws to Online Communications, 29 GA.
L. REV. 1075, 1079-81 (1995); Richard Raysman & Peter Brown, Liability on the
Internet, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 8, 1994, at 3.
18. "[Rleiance on existing copyright law is dangerous, because it ignores the
unique issues that arise when information is transmitted over computer networks.&"
Denise Caruso, Digital Commerce: Should an Extension of Current Copyright Law,
Tweaked a Bit, Govern the Internet?, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 1996, at D7.
19. Michael Meyer & Anne Underwood, Crimes of the 'Net', NEWSWEEK, Nov.
14, 1994, at 46, 46.
20. See Warren Caragata, Crime in Cybercity, MACLEAN'S, May 22, 1995, at
50, 50.
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lost royalties at stake. Simply put, without better protection,
creators will no longer create. The world will have a medium
which theoretically promotes the free and unfettered flow of
material and information, but there will be no material.2
Copyright holders will not allow their work to be reproduced
and disseminated in digital form for fear that they will lose all
control over further dissemination of their work.22 In addition,
it might not be possible for copyright holders to prevent the
unauthorized digitalization of their work. It is also quite
possible that if unauthorized digitalization occurred, copyright
holders might never be made aware of this fact, because
policing of such a vast and interconnected network is so
difficult. As a result, creators may no longer create at all.'
This situation would be a net loss for both society and the
original creator because copyright holders in printed works will
lose access to the vast potential audiences that the Internet
can provide, and "Net" subscribers will lose out on access to
the works themselves, especially if creators decide not only to
refuse to permit their works to be digitized, but also to refrain
from producing anything at all.'
Another important reason that a workable copyright
regime is necessary stems from the fact that the potential
exists for widespread distribution of, and unauthorized
changes to, copyrighted works in a digital world." The
authenticity and reliability of copyrighted work is at risk, and
if the work is altered in any material way, subsequent users
who need to rely on the information would be harmed. 6
C. The Unique ProblemsPresented By the Internet
Legislators attempting to grapple with the need for
effective copyright laws to govern the Internet will be faced
with many difficult challenges. Perhaps the largest and most
important problem facing the Internet is the fact that national
boundaries are disregarded and easily transcended by this

21.
22.
control
23.
24.
25.
26.

See McCoy & Boddie, supra note 7, at 194.
In all probability, under the current "system," rights holders would lose all
over the dissemination of their work. See id. at 175.
Id.
Id.
Raysman & Brown, supra note 17, at 9.
Id.
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"global" information superhighway. 7 As nations around the
world begin to formulate national copyright laws to govern
Internet use within their own borders, enforcers of these laws
confront the enormous challenge of determining which
country's laws apply in a given situation, and to whom they
apply.' Even assuming that all nations around the world
were to adopt stringent copyright laws,29 a medium like the
Internet cannot be governed on a nation-by-nation basis.'o
This choice-of-law issue is especially vexing in light of the fact
that one can never be sure where the "offense" occurred. 3' The
possibilities seem endless. Some might argue that the law of
the nation where the material originated should be used,
assuming that such law can be ascertained. Others could argue
that the law of the nation where the material originally was
downloaded should govern, assuming that such law can be
determined. Still others might argue that the law of the nation
where the material eventually ends up should control. To
exacerbate the problem, it is often difficult to determine who
downloaded the information, uploaded the information,
whether that person is a minor, 2 or whether he or she is
subject to the jurisdiction of the country whose law has been
chosen to govern. Furthermore, the country where the "offense"
occurred may not respect copyright laws and the "infringing"
3
action may not be considered unlawful in that country.
As can be seen by the brief analysis of the choice-of-law

27. See Dunne, supra note 8, at 9-10.

28. See Caragata, supra note 20, at 52.
29. All nations have not adopted stringent copyright laws as of yet. The law
has been extremely slow to catch up to the emerging technologies. Furthermore,
existing laws passed to govern works in print cannot be effective in a digitized
world. Salomon & Pierce, supra note 8, at 316 ("Laws that were designed to
protect writers, composers, sculptors, visual artists and other authors may possibly
be obsolete in the face of a technology that renders meaningless the distinction
between originals and copies, displays and distribution, and even authors and their
audiences.").
30. See Dunne, supra note 8, at 10; see also Motoko Rich, Electronic Poser for

Copyright Laws, FIN. TMS, Aug. 22, 1994, at 10 ("It would be difficult to say
where the copyright infringement took place. Right now the laws are jurisdictional
but the Internet is global.").
31. See Caragata, supra note 20, at 52.
32. Of course, the classification of the Internet user as a minor will be
dependent upon the jurisdiction picked.
33. "[O]rimes in one country are not necessarily crimes in the next." Friedman
et al., supra note 4, at S-3.
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issues confronting regulation of the Internet, its very nature
necessitates an international, rather than a national regime of
copyright protection and regulation. "There is no single nation
whose laws can viably control behavior in cyberspace... Short
of a new international law and enforcement mechanisms, there
is no viable way to impose existing... law on general behavior
in cyberspace."34 Even if each nation of the world were to
enact the most stringent national copyright laws, the world
would still be faced with a system of ineffective national laws
trying to function separately within a completely international
system. Meanwhile, no international law has been developed to
satisfy this need.
Assuming, however, that it is possible to resolve the
complex jurisdictional issues plaguing the Internet, the
possible anonymity of the information uploaders and
downloaders 5 would render this issue moot. It is virtually
impossible to trace where information has originated, who is
responsible for placing the material on the Internet, and who
is downloading the information; users can connect through
numerous computers in foreign nations and basically erase any
trace of their identity. 6 Choosing a national law is useless if
there is no one against whom it can be enforced.
The original concept of the Internet as a shared resource,
encouraging the free flow of information and ideas, also poses
a huge dilemma for legislators. The original users of the
Internet were not in favor of restricting access to any of the
materials made available on the Internet, whether copyrighted
or not.3 In addition, "shareware,"3 8 which operates on an

34. Dunne, supra note 8, at 10.

35. "Downloading" constitutes obtaining a file from a bulletin board service
and uploading constitutes placing the material on that bulletin board service. I.
Trotter Hardy, The ProperLegal Regime for 'Cyberspace", 55 U. PT. L. REV. 993,
1002 (1994).
36. "Anonymous re-mailers" are the names given to computers which are used
to divest the identity of someone who is sending a message. Id. at 1011 n.44.
37. The earliest Internet users were independent, laissez-faire types who

tended to believe that computer access should be unlimited and that "all
information should be free." Dunne, supra note 8, at 10 (citing Dorothy Denning,
Concerning Hackers Who Break Into Computer Systems (paper presented at the
13th National Computer Security Conference, Washington D.C., Oct. 1-4, 1990)).
38. "Shareware" is a method of software publication and dissemination in

which a software

creator, wishing to distribute his creation without huge

marketing and manufacturing costs, puts it on a computer bulletin board service.

Anyone who would like to try the software simply downloads it from the bulletin
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honor system, makes it extremely difficult to enforce copyright
laws and to ensure that copyright holders are compensated for
their work. The concept of shareware simply makes it too easy
for users to download this copyrighted software and never pay
for it, taking full advantage of the fact that shareware operates
on such an honor system. Furthermore, the nature of
shareware creates a belief among users that all information on
the Internet should be shared and just as easily downloadable
as shareware materials; this belief, in turn, leads to copyright
infringement.
The ease, quickness, and quality of uploaded and
downloaded material also poses a problem for legislators.
Digitized copies 9 are perfect replicas and many can be made
at once without any loss in resulting quality. The relatively
low cost and wide availability of the equipment necessary to
accomplish this replication embodies a drastic change from
previous modes of copying.4" It has become cheaper, easier,
and more profitable to make and distribute copies digitally
rather than by use of the old Xerox machine. In addition, it is
often difficult to detect digital copies in the marketplace. It is a
direct result of these technological improvements that
copyright infringement along the Internet has become big
business. Unless legislators can react quickly with new laws
aimed directly at curbing infringement on the Internet, the
problem will continue to spiral further out of control.
Legislators are also faced with the ease and widespread
ability of potential infringers to convert already-published
works, which employ older technologies, into digital form,
without the permission or even the knowledge of the original
copyright holder.4 ' Original copyright holders cannot bring

board. If the user wants to continue to use the software past a certain
introductory period, he must pay a shareware fee to the programmer or creator. If
he does not, he is in violation of copyright law. Steve Givens, Sharing Shareware:
Non-Traditional Marketing Relies on Honor System, ST. LOUIS BUS. J., July 1-7,

1991, at lB.
39. Digitizing information entails encoding the original material into a
sequence of ones and zeroes. Once this is accomplished, the digitized information
has the potential to be copied endlessly. Friedman et al., supra note 4, at S-2;
Rex S. Heinke & Heather D. Rafter, Rough Justice in Cyberspace: Liability on the
Electronic Frontier, COMPUTER LAW., July 1994, at 1, 3 ("Nearly every type of
copyrighted work can be transformed into digital form...
40. Friedman et al., supra note 4, at S-2.
41. See Heinke & Rafter, supra note 39, at 3-4.
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lawsuits for infringement because they do not know that their
work has been made available on the Internet, or they find out
after substantial damage has already been done.42 This has
become a widespread problem and will continue to grow as the
Internet expands, becoming more unwieldy, and even more
difficult to monitor. Similarly, legislators are faced with the
possibility that works might be altered from their original
form,43 that copyright notices could simply be deleted from the
works,4 or that there could be false attribution as to the
origin of the work. 45 Absent policing, these things are
temptingly easy to do. Even if bulletin board postings were
monitored in some way, and even if downloaders have no
intention of violating any copyright laws, they may be doing so
inadvertently and can be found liable for copyright
infringement under the current laws.46
Another dilemma facing legislators is the sheer size and
interconnectedness of the Internet. It is hard to say how many
different bulletin boards currently exist on the Internet, let
alone the exact content of any one bulletin board at a given
time. To exacerbate this problem, the content of any one
bulletin board or network service has the ability to constantly
and instantly change without any notice.47 Some estimates in
1994 put the number of bulletin board services (BBS's) 48 at
over 100,000, 49 with at least 60,000 in the United States
alone, and counting.' Furthermore, the majority of BBS's
furnish little or no control over the nature or the content of the
material carried over their service. 51

42. See David Loundy, E-Law: Legal Issues Affecting Computer Information
Systems and System Operator Liability, 12 COMPUTER/L.J. 101, 145 (1993).
43. See id. at 144.
44. See id. at 145.
45. Id.
46. Copyright infringement is a strict liability crime subject to limitations in
the United States that does not require intent or knowledge to find that a
violation has occurred. De Acosta v. Brown, 146 F.2d 408, 410-412 (2d Cir. 1944),
cert. denied, 325 U.S. 862 (1945).
47. "At best, one can take a snapshot of it [the Internet], but even this record
is out of date before the information is tallied." Dunne, supra note 8, at 2.
48. A bulletin board service (BBS) is any computer service that is accessed
through electronic communications technology. Hardy, supra note 35, at 1000.
49. Heinke & Rafter, supra note 39, at 2.
50. Hardy, supra note 35, at 1007 n.35 (citing Kathleen Doler, INV. Bus.
DAILY, Feb. 17, 1994, Computers and Automation Sec., at 4).
51. Heinke & Rafter, supra note 39, at 2.
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Because there is no central overseer of the Internet or
single one entity in charge of policing what is available on the
Internet, regulation and legislation is extremely problematic.
Individual BBS's are operated by system "Sysops,"52 which
sometimes attempt to restrict or monitor objectionable or
protected material, depending on the particular policies of the
individual BBS, but the enormous volume of material, and the
difficulty in identifying such material, usually makes detection
impractical. 3
The potential of "beating" copy protection methods used by
creators and manufacturers also poses a dilemma if these
devices are even used. In the mid-1980s, many software
creators began to use copy protection devices in their
programs.' 4 Although these methods were generally effective
at thwarting unauthorized users, users nonetheless complained
of the time and complexity involved in dealing with these
devices, and they felt that the devices interfered with
legitimate use of the software.55 The industry responded, for
the most part, by leaving these devices off their products.56
Those manufacturers who have chosen to keep the copy
protection devices are faced with the fact that for every
technological breakthrough they make in the development of
these devices, pirates can quickly develop another device that
can beat them. This can become a never-ending cycle that can
cost software manufacturers millions of dollars. Without these
encryption devices, programs are much easier to reproduce in
violation of existing copyright laws. The fact that
manufacturers today are less likely to use copy protection
devices on their programs makes the expeditious development
of a workable copyright regime even more essential.
The very nature of the Internet poses another huge
problem for legislators. Under existing copyright law, at least
in the United States, when material is downloaded into the
Random Access Memory (RAM) of any personal computer, a
52. 'Each BBS is run by its own system operator, known as a 'Sysop.'" Id.
53. Id.
54. John C. Dvorak, No Protection, Please, CANADIAN DATASYSTEMS, Sept.
1992, at 70. An example of a copy protection device was the original "key disk."
Each time a user wished to use the copy protected software, he had to insert the
.original key disk" into the computer. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
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"copy" of that material is made.57 If the material is protected
by a copyright, and the copyright holder has not granted
permission for that "copy," downloading that material is
considered copyright infringement. 8 The only problem with
this type of definition for the word "copy," is that it would be
impossible to "use" Internet material in any other way.59 In
order to view any of the files from a network or a BBS, one
must download that material into the RAM of a computer,
even if it is for just enough time to simply read the file in its
entirety." At least in the United States, it does not seem that
Congress intended to reserve in copyright holders the exclusive
"reading rights" to their copyrighted works. 1 However, if the
current definition of "copy" remains the same, that is exactly
what copyright holders are getting in addition to the exclusive
rights to also control "viewing" and "listening" to any of their
works once they are in their digitized form.6" Copyright
holders are being granted the exclusive right to prevent
Internet users from reading their works because this cannot be
done without making a "copy." Furthermore, the current
interpretation of what constitutes a "copy" would seem to
foreclose the possibility that copyright holders could ever
license the "use" of their works over the Internet.' Under
current definitions, it would seem that Internet material
cannot be "used," because by trying to access copyrighted
material by downloading it, the material is "copied."
Consequently, the "user" would be deemed an infringer.
Furthermore, many cyberspace users are completely
unfamiliar with any of the existing copyright laws and the

57. Litman, supra note 10, at 41 n.58 (citing NII REPORT, supra note 6).
58. Id.
59. See id. at 40.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 40-43. In enacting the 1976 Copyright Act, specifically 17 U.S.C.
§ 106 (1994), Congress granted certain exclusive rights to the copyright holder,
including the exclusive right of reproduction. Nowhere in § 106 is it mentioned
that the copyright holder also retains the exclusive right to read the material, nor
is there any evidence in the legislative history of this section that this exclusive
right was ever contemplated. However, recent interpretations of this statute have
pronounced that one "reproduces" a work every time one downloads its information
into the RAM of a computer. Litman, supra note 10, at 40.
62. Litman, supra note 10, at 31-32.
63. "Owning a copyright means no one can use it without receiving a license
from you." Geraldine Fabrikant, EMI Music Publishing Fills Chairman'sPost, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 21, 1991, at D4.
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implications that their Internet actions may have." Most are

completely unaware that downloading material into the RAM
of their computers, even if they never actually print the

material or share it with anyone else, technically constitutes a
reproduction under current U.S. copyright law and thus makes
them infringers, albeit unintentionally.6 5 To aggravate the
problem even further, although children currently account for
only approximately two percent of total Internet users, 6 their

numbers are expected to dramatically increase in the next
decade.

Unless children can be taught the complexities of

the current copyright statute early on, lessons that most of
their adult counterparts have yet to learn, they too will join
the ranks of copyright infringers.
The next problem facing legislators is the breed of
computer "hackers" who seem to derive great pleasure from

"cracking the system" and accessing protected and confidential

material.68 Hackers fully understand the implications of their

actions,69 but they act anyway, believing that material on the
information superhighway should be free for all."0 "[A]lthough

an ethically undesirable pursuit, [hacking] is practised for a
mixture of innocent and questionable reasons; the intellectual
challenge, admiration of peers, the need to cause mayhem and

destruction or illicitly gain software or data."" Many hackers

64. "The current copyright statute has proved to be remarkably educationresistant." Litman, supra note 10, at 50.
65. "One part of the problem is that many people persist in believing that
laws make sense....

Our current copyright statute has more than merely a

provision or two or three or ten that don't make a lot of sense; it's chock-full of
them." Id.; see also Jessica Litman, Copyright as Myth, 53 U. PITr. L. REV. 235
(1991) (discussing why copyright law is counterintuitive to the authorship process).
66. Peter H. Lewis, On the Net, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 1995, at 39.
67. President Clinton stated in his most recent State of the Union Address
that he wanted to see every classroom in America connected to the Internet by
the year 2000, and added that by Spring 1996, 20% of the classrooms in
California would be connected to the Internet. Leo Rennert, President: Do More
With Less, SACRAmENTO BEE, Jan. 24, 1996, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,

Curnws File.
68. Noted one hacker: "It was just for the thrill of getting free software or
logging onto pirate bulletin boards that normal people don't know about .... "
Adam S. Bauman, The Pirates of the Internet, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 3, 1994, at Al,
A18.
69. See Berni Dwan, Internet Ethics, COMPUTER FRAUD & SEC. BULL., Feb.

1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Curnws File.
70. Dunne, supra note 8, at 10 (citing Denning, supra note 37).
71. Dwan, supra note 69.
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believe that hacking is mentally challenging. They feel
rewarded when they are able to bypass the security of a new
computer system.72
Finally, aside from hackers, the "profile" of other potential
infringers also poses a problem. The problem arises from the
fact that there really is no "profile" of the average Internet
cruiser and hence, no "profile" of a potential infringer. Users
are no longer just the computer nerds and geeks of
yesteryear.73 Anyone with a personal computer, a modem, and
a telephone can now access vast amounts of copyrighted
material at the touch of a button and become "infringers."7
Furthermore, there exists the apparent widespread belief that
it is not a crime to "copy" the latest computer software or to
give a downloaded program to a friend." As long as this type
of attitude persists, infringement will be rampant on the
Internet under the current regulation regime.
III. How OTHER INDUSTRIES
PROBLEMS

HAVE DEALT WITH SIMILAR

This is not the first time that copyright law has fallen
behind technology, nor will it be the last.7" The world has
witnessed a virtual explosion of new technologies in the latter
half of the twentieth century. Copyright law has gradually
responded to them in a multitude of ways. This section will
examine other industries that were faced with problems
similar to those plaguing the Internet and will focus on
legislative responses to these problems.
A. Compulsory Licensing
Under U.S. copyright law, copyright holders are granted
certain exclusive rights in their copyrighted works,77 subject
72. Id.
73. See Bauman, supra note 68, at Al.

74. As prices for computers and modems continue to drop, more and more
people are going on-line.
75. See Intellectual Property: The Property of the Mind, ECONOMIsT, July 27Aug. 2, 1996, at 57, 57.
76. See Kim L. Milone, Comment, Dithering Over Digitization: International
Copyright and Licensing Agreements Between Museums, Artists, and New Media
Publishers, 5 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 393, 423 (1995).
77. These exclusive rights include the right to reproduce the copyrighted
works in copies or phonorecords, the right to prepare derivative works, the right
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to some exceptions. 8 The compulsory license is one of those
exceptions. The compulsory license
resembles an unwritten contract which gives the user
unlimited use of the work or product in return for the
promise that he will pay a fee or royalty at some later
date... [and] the holder of a copyright in a work must grant
[it] to one who uses the work in any of the ways specified by
the Copyright Law.79
Once the licensee pays a royalty fee, the licensee has the right
to use the work in its entirety, and the copyright holder has no
right to refuse, restrict, or in any way interfere with the
licensee's enjoyment of applicable statutory rights." Compulsory licenses cut down on transaction costs between copyright
holders and potential licensees, but they also limit the control
that copyright holders have over their work.8 In the past,
Congress has used the compulsory license to keep pace with
new technologies,82 to help industries to grow by decreasing
transaction costs,83 and to prevent monopolies from forming.' These objectives are accomplished by setting a statutorily fixed royalty payment for copyright holders, which frees
users from negotiating individually with each copyright holder
to determine royalty payments. 5

to distribute copies or phonorecords, the right to perform works publicly, and the
right to publicly display the copyrighted work. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994). These
rights were granted under the Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 106,
90 Stat. 2541, 2546 (1976), which superseded the Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320,
§ 1, 35 Stat. 1075, 1075-76 (1909).
78. 17 U.S.C. §§ 107-120 (1994).
79. Midge M. Hyman, Note, The Socialization of Copyright: The Increased Use
of Compulsory Licenses, 4 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 105, 107 (1985).
80. Darlene A. Cote, Note, Chipping Away at the Copyright Owner's Rights:
Congress' Continued Reliance on the Compulsory License, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L.
219, 226 (1994).
81. Id. at 221.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Aram Dobalian, Copyright Protection for the Non-Literal Elements of Computer Programs: The Need for Compulsory Licensing, 15 WHrrrIER L. REV. 1019,
1067 (1994).
85. The cable industry is an example of this type of payment scheme. While
recognizing that copyright holders should be compensated when their programs are
retransmitted, Congress also sought to ensure that the cable television industry
would continue to grow, develop, and serve the communication needs of the general public. Murphy, supra note 16, at 249. This congressional intent was clearly
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Compulsory licensing was. first introduced in the United
States with passage of the 1909 Copyright Act. s" It was aimed
at preventing a monopoly in the player piano roll industry."
The 1909 Act prohibited the copyright owner from refusing to
license a particular use, while in return the copyright holder
was granted the right to receive a statutorily set royalty payment for any mechanical reproductions of the work, including
the use of music in player piano rolls."
The 1909 Act was superseded by the 1976 Copyright Act.
With enactment of this act, Congress modified the mechanical
compulsory license established by the 1909 act and expanded
the use of compulsory licenses to include public performance of
music on jukeboxes, public broadcasting, and retransmission
by cable systems of broadcast signals.8 9 In 1988, Congress
expanded compulsory licensing still further by establishing this
type of protection for retransmission by satellite carriers of
broadcast signals to private home viewers."
1. Cable Television and the Compulsory License
Compulsory licensing was introduced to cable television in
the United States with the 1976 Copyright Act. "Congress
recognized that excessive transaction costs in the cable television industry prevented bargaining between copyright owners
and all potential users of the copyrighted material."9' The
legislative history preceding the adoption of this scheme evidenced congressional intent at the time:
reflected in the fact that the royalty rate set by statute was clearly below the
market value for cable retransmission. Id. Indeed, "[no one denies that the cable
royalty rates under the Copyright Act of 1976 and the compulsory license were set
artificially low. These rates have no connection with economic data or analysis or
marketplace value. No one denies that." Copyright Royalty Fees for Cable Systems:
Hearingson H.R. 2802 and H.R. 3419 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liber.
ties and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th
Cong., 2d Sess. 108 (1984) (testimony of Jack Valenti, President, Motion Picture
Association of America); see Murphy, supra note 16, at 249 n.77.
86. Dobalian, supra note 84, at 1067.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1068-69.
90. Satellite Home Viewer Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, § 202, 102 Stat.
3949, 3949 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § l19(a)(1) (1994)). For a discussion
of the Satellite Home Viewer Act (SHVA), see infra notes 111-120 and accompanying text.
91. Dobalian, supra note 84, at 1068.
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In general, the Committee believes that cable systems are
commercial enterprises whose basic retransmission operations are based on the carriage of copyrighted program material and that copyright royalties should be paid by cable
operators to the creators of such programs. The committee
recognizes, however, that it would be impractical and unduly
burdensome to require every cable system to negotiate with
every copyright owner whose work was retransmitted by a
cable system.9 2
The cable industry began as a means to improve the reception of local broadcasts in outlying areas." Local broadcasters
negotiated with copyright holders, and the cable station then
picked up the signal and delivered it to the outlying areas. The
cable companies did this at no cost to themselves.' As technology improved, cable stations began to pick up and deliver
signals from distant "local" broadcasters, which encroached on
the local broadcaster's exclusive right to the copyrighted material. As a result, some television stations refused to purchase
copyrighted programs because these programs were already
being broadcast on rival stations by cable companies who could
pick up the signal from distant stations and never pay the
copyright holder or seek his or her permission." Cable companies were sued for copyright infringement, but the Supreme
Court refused to find infringement.9 6
The 1976 Copyright Act was Congress' attempt to strike a
compromise between copyright holders and the cable companies.9" This act recognized the rights of copyright holders by
granting them a royalty for use of their material in broadcasts.
At the same time, the act recognized the cable companies'
interests by instituting a compulsory licensing scheme so that
the companies did not have to negotiate with individual right
holders.98 The act set the statutory royalty fee well below its

92. Id. at 1068 n.279 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 89

(1976)).
93. Cote, supra note 80, at 228.

94. Id.
95.
96.
(1968);
97.
98.

Id. at 228-29.
See Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390
Teleprompter Corp. v. CBS, 415 U.S. 394 (1974).
Cote, supra note 80, at 230.
Id. at 230-31.
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fair market value.9 The compulsory license was enacted with
the belief that this type of regulation would continue indefinitely and that the statutorily set fees would continue to function as an indispensable part of the regulatory framework.' °
The scheme guaranteed payment to copyright holders in the
form of the statutorily set royalty fee, but it removed the ability of copyright holders to bargain for their fees.' Furthermore, in addition to striking a compromise between copyright
holders and cable companies, the act was promulgated to meet
the needs of the viewing public and to ensure that there was a
wide variety of programming available." 2
2. Satellite Television and the Compulsory License
The satellite television compulsory license also came about
as a result of a technology improvement.0 3 It began with
superstations like WTBS and WOR-TV which were employing
the new nationwide satellite distribution system rather than
the more expensive microwave transmission that had previously prevented their growth.0 4 As these stations flourished,
so did satellite technology in general. This in turn lowered
costs significantly and made satellite dishes affordable for
viewers at home.0 5
Satellite dishes for home viewers posed a major problem:
individuals were able to receive signals directly from satellite
carriers and avoid paying fees either directly to the copyright
holder or indirectly in the form of a cable subscription.' Satellite carriers sought to prevent this direct reception by scrambling their signals.' Copyright holders claimed that the
scrambling of the signals by satellite carriers constituted an
altered secondary transmission, taking their transmission out
of the category of "passive carrier," which had previously pro-

99. Murphy, supra note 16, at 249. Instead, the royalty rates designated by
the statute are based on the number of signals that a carrier transmits as well as
total revenue. Id.
100. Id.
101. See id.
102. Cote, supra note 80, at 231.
103. Id. at 233.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 233-34.
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tected them from copyright infringement under the 1976 Copyright Act. 08 Lawsuits ensued and the courts came to the rescue of the fledgling industry and found no infringement."0 9
Congress eventually responded to the tension-riddled industry
by enacting another compulsory licensing scheme employing
the same rationale used to justify the compulsory license for
the cable industry: "allowing a new technology to grow and
supporting a new industry.""0
In 1988 Congress enacted the Satellite Home Viewers Act
(SHVA)."' "The SHVA created a compulsory license for secondary transmissions by satellite carriers of primary transmissions of superstations and network transmissions for private
viewing by owners of satellite dishes.""' The SHVA attempts
to balance the copyright holder's need for protection by allowing satellite carriers to continue scrambling signals while, at
the same time, addressing the needs of the public and its access to programming."'
The SHVA licensing scheme however, differs from the
cable licensing scheme in two important ways. First, unlike the
cable compulsory license, the SHVA was passed with a sunset
date of December 31, 1994." This is an important difference

108. Id. at 234. According to § 111 of the Copyright Act:
The secondary transmission of a primary transmission embodying a performance or display of a work is not infringement of copyright if... the
secondary transmission is made by any carrier who has no direct or
indirect control over the content or selection of the primary transmission
or over the particular recipients of the secondary transmission, and
whose activities with respect to the secondary transmission consist solely
of providing wires, cables, or other communications channels for the use
of others ....
17 U.S.C. § 111(a)(3) (1994).
109. See, e.g., Hubbard Broadcasting, Inc. v. Southern Satellite Sys., Inc., 777
F.2d 393 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1005 (1986) (holding that satellite
carrier fell within exemption of § 111(a)(3)).
110. Cote, supra note 80, at 235.
111. Pub. L. No. 100-667, § 202, 102 Stat. 3949, 3949 (codified as amended at
17 U.S.C. § 119 (1994)).
112. Cote, supra note 80, at 235.
113. Id.
114. In late 1994, the compulsory license for satellite television was renewed
for an additional five years. Satellite Home Viewer Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103369, § 4(a), 108 Stat. 3477, 3481 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 119 note (1994) (Termination of Section)). Compulsory licensing of secondary transmissions by cable systems has also been enacted. Pub. L. No. 104-39, § 5(b), 109 Stat. 348 (codified at
17 U.S.C. § 111(c)(1) (1994)).
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between the two licensing schemes because unlike the cable
compulsory license, the legislators responsible for this licensing
regime recognized that at some point in the future this industry would no longer need to be propped up by compulsory licensing and, accordingly, set a date for the scheme to end.
Many opponents of the continuance of the cable compulsory license argue that one of the main purposes of the licensing
scheme is to allow a new industry to grow and develop through
close government supervision." 5 "The industry, however, has
reached a level of financial stability and public acceptance, and
no longer needs this protective support."' By setting a sunset date for the satellite television compulsory licensing
scheme, the SHVA "avoids some of the complaints directed at
the cable compulsory license .... "117
Second, unlike the cable compulsory license, the SHVA
was promulgated in two phases. During the first phase, lasting
from December of 1988 until December of 1992, royalty fees
were set at predetermined rates."' During the second phase,
lasting from December of 1992 until December of 1994, fees
were set either by negotiation or binding arbitration."9 By
instituting a fee schedule that gradually phased out predetermined royalty fees, legislators responsible for the SHVA were
attempting to move the satellite television industry towards
greater dialogue between copyright holders and satellite signal
carriers with less governmental control over prices and the
resulting lower royalty fees associated with government price
controls. Although this dialogue will increase transaction costs,
it is believed that the groundwork that the parties laid during
the first phase will minimize these costs significantly.

115. "The most compelling argument in support of the cable and satellite compulsory licenses has been the need to promote new technology and support infant
industries." Cote, supra note 80, at 237.
116. Id. at 232 (citing 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON
COPYRIGHT § 8.18[A], 8-197 (1994)).

117. Id. at 235.
118. During phase one, royalty fees were determined in much the same way
that royalty fees are determined under the cable compulsory licensing scheme.
Compare 17 U.S.C. § 119(b)(1)(B)(i)-(iii) (1988) with 17 U.S.C. § 111(d)(1)(A)-(D)
(1994).
119. See 17 U.S.C. § 119(c) (1994).
120. Cote, supra note 80, at 237.
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B. The Music Industry, Royalty Collection Societies, and Blanket Licensing
Before the advent of the phonograph and the broadcast
medium, a musical composer's primary source of income was
royalties from sheet music."' Once phonographs and broadcasting came into wide use, however, public performance
rights, exclusively reserved to the U.S. copyright holder begin-

ning with the 1909 Copyright Act, became extremely important.22 As public performance rights became lucrative to the

copyright holder, problems quickly emerged. Because public
performances were fleeting in nature,"2 unauthorized performances were difficult for the copyright holder to discern, let
alone prove.' Furthermore, it became difficult for potential
licensees to seek out copyright holders individually in order to
get their permission to perform their works."2 In response to
these two interrelated difficulties, a licensing society was
formed to serve as a clearinghouse for the facilitation of the
licensing, policing, and enforcement of copyright holders' public

performance rights.'26

In the U.S. music industry today, the public performing
rights to most copyrighted musical works are licensed to the

major performing rights societies 27 like the American Society
of Composers, Authors, and Publishers (ASCAP)," Broadcast

Music, Inc. (BMI)," 9 and SESAC, Inc.'

These performing

121. Jay M. Fujitani, Comment, Controlling the Market Power of Performing
Rights Societies: an Administrative Substitute for Antitrust Regulation, 72 CAL. L.
REV. 103, 104 (1984).
122. Id.
123. A public performance is considered to be fleeting in nature because once it
is over, unless recorded, there is no tangible proof that it ever occurred.
124. Fujitani, supra note 121, at 105.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 103. Television networks and most local stations have license agreements with all three of the major licensing societies, ASCAP, BMI, and SESAC,
Inc. RALPH S. BROWN & ROBERT C. DENICOLA, CASES ON COPYRIGHT: UNFAIR COMPETITION AND OTHER TOPICS BEARING ON THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY, MUSICAL,
AND ARTISTIC WORKS 513-14 (6th ed. 1995) (citing Herman Finkelstein, Public Performance Rights in Music and Performance Rights Societies, in SEVEN COPYRIGHT
PROBLEMS ANALYZED 69, 76 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1966) (1953)).
128. ASCAP was established in 1914 and unlike the other licensing societies, it
is comprised wholly of publishers, authors, and composers. Id. at 513 (citing
Finkelstein, supra note 127, at 75).
129. Id. "BMI is a non-profit performing rights organization expressly recog-
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rights societies either issue "blanket licenses" for use of the
society's entire repertory,'' or "per-program" licenses.'32
Once a license is issued, licensees can "perform" the work in
any way that they choose. 3 Royalties are closely regulated
by the federal government and must be "reasonable." 3 If the
licensee believes that the established royalties are "unreasonable," the licensee may take the performing rights society to
court for a judicially determined "reasonable royalty."' Po-

nized by the [U.S.] Copyright Act. Individual publishers grant to BMI a non-exclusive right to license public performance rights in their musical compositions."
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Claire's Boutiques, Inc., 949 F.2d 1482, 1484 (7th Cir.
1991) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 911 (1992). BMI is a corporation
owned by, and operated for, the radio broadcast industry. Finkelstein, supra note
127, at 75. It was established in response to an expanding radio industry in which
its predecessor, ASCAP, was demanding larger and larger royalty payments based
upon higher percentages of gross revenues. BROWN & DENICOLA, supra note 127,
at 515. The radio broadcasting industry refused to deal with ASCAP and established a competing society, BMI, to secure copyrights and also to negotiate with
foreign collection societies so that American radio stations could play foreign musical works. Id.
130. SESAC, Inc. was formerly known as the Society of European Stage Authors and Composers, but is today referred to by its acronym only. SESAC is a
privately owned, profit-making company. BROWN & DENICOLA, supra note 127, at
513 (citing Finkestein, supra note 127, at 75).
131. The number of works that a licensee uses is irrelevant with a blanket license. A licensee still pays for use of the entire repertory. Stations that have
these blanket licenses "pay a percentage on all their receipts from the sale of
'time on the air.'" Id. at 514 (citing Finkestein, supra note 127, at 76).
132. Stations that have per-program licenses pay only on those programs in
which the Society's repertory is performed. Id. Per-program licensees may still
use any work within the society's repertory. Fee percentages for per-program
licenses are generally higher than those charged for blanket licenses. Fujitani,
supra note 121, at 105-06.
133. BROWN & DENICOLA, supra note 127, at 514 (citing Finkelstein, supra note
127, at 77).
134. ASCAP is regulated to a large extent by a consent decree under the
Sherman Antitrust Act. Id. at 515. The ASCAP consent decrees can be found in:
1940-43 Trade Cas. (CCH) I 56,104; 1950-51 Trade Cas. (CCH) 9%
62,595; 1960
Trade Cas. T169,612.
135. The principle of the "reasonable" royalty was established to protect licensees from any exorbitant demands of ASCAP, especially in light of the fact that
BMI and ASCAP held a virtual monopoly over the public performing rights in the
music industry. BROWN & DENICOLA, supra note 127, at 516-17 (discussing AldenRochelle, Inc. v. ASCAP, 80 F. Supp. 888 (S.D.N.Y. 1948), and M. Witmark &
Sons v. Jensen, 80 F. Supp. 843 (D. Minn. 1948)). The collection society then has
the burden of proving to the court that the rate is, in fact, "reasonable." Id. at
522 (citing K-91, Inc. v. Gershwin Publishing Corp., 372 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1045 (1968)). If the court agrees with the licensee that the
rate is unreasonable, it has the authority to fix its own fee. Id.
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tential licensees have the option of dealing individually with
the copyright holder or collectively with the royalty collection
society."' 6 However, in the case of entities like radio stations
and television networks, it is wholly impractical and nearly
impossible for negotiations to occur individually between each
copyright holder and the licensees."3 7 The volume of works
used by these licensees is enormous. Without these royalty
38
collection societies, transaction costs would be prohibitive.
Most fees charged by these societies are based upon a
percentage of revenues, although some licensees are charged a
flat fee.' 3' ASCAP fees become part of a common fund which
is divided equally among publishers' and writers' member
groups. 40 These groups then either distribute the fees based
upon the number of performances of a member's works,' or
based upon a complex "spreading of payments" formula.'
BMI does not offer remuneration to its copyright holders on
anything but a current basis.' The performing rights societies monitor their licensees in order to discern the number of
total public performances so that they can accordingly remunerate their copyright holders. This is accomplished by taping
broadcasts, examining station logs, and checking programs.'4
However, the societies cannot monitor all of their licensees'
performances, thus forcing the societies to take a representative sampling in order to determine national levels. The societ136. Id. at 514 (citing Finkelstein, supra note 127, at 76).
137. Id.
138. "The need for bulk licensing of performing rights is nowhere more evident

than in the radio and television field where program directors require the greatest
latitude in building their shows while protecting the station, its sponsors and
artists from claims in infringement." Id. (quoting Finkeistein, supra note 127, at

76).
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. The number of performances of a member's work is calculated on the
basis of periodic objective surveys. Id. at 517-18. A 1950 judgment against ASCAP
eliminated the previous subjective standards used to distribute royalties. Id. at
517.
142. Id. at 518-19. This payment spreading formula is a complex system of

points, classes, and rules of administration which can protect the copyright holder
from rather large fluctuations in income from year to year, and also serves as a
way of possibly deferring income to leaner years by looking at factors other than
current performances (i.e., "sustained performances"). See id.
143. Id. at 520.
144. Fujitani, supra note 121, at 106 n.18 (citing S. SHEMEL & M.
KRASILOVSKY, THIS BUSINESS OF Music 163 (rev. ed. 1977)).
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ies also police non-licensees within the industry in order to
ensure that these non-licensees are not making unauthorized
uses of their copyrighted material. 4 5
European nations also have their own copyright societies
for the licensing of public performance rights. Copyright societies have evolved throughout Europe in different ways. 4 ' In
some countries, many collection societies exist, but each society
deals with its own limited copyright field. 7 In other countries, there are just a few societies that deal with numerous
copyright fields.'48 Even in countries where many societies
exist, however, because they each deal with a limited area, the
individual societies "have a de facto monopoly in the fields
looked after by them, so that to this extent competitive situations do not arise."4 9 In France, the Societe des Auteurs,
Compositairs, et Editeurs de Musique (SACEM) is the clearinghouse for performing rights. 5 ' In Great Britain, blanket licenses authorizing public performances of copyrighted musical
works are issued by the Performing Rights Society (PRS)."5'
In Germany, music performance rights are licensed by
Gesellschaft ffir musikalische Auffihrungs (GEMA).'5 2 GEMA
is required by German law to license its copyright holders'
performance rights upon equitable terms to any potential licensee upon the licensee's request, to engage in blanket contracts on equitable terms with associations of users, and to
establish scales of fees that allow for certain special interests.'53 While GEMA is permitted to issue blanket licenses of
all of its members' works, the German government prohibits
GEMA from preventing its members from licensing their works
with other licensing societies (foreign or domestic). GEMA is
also prohibited from requiring that its members license all
categories of rights to GEMA.'" The U.S. societies have reciprocal agreements with many of these licensing societies,
145. Id.
146. ADOLPH DIETZ, COPYRIGHT LAW IN THE EUROPEAN CoMMUNITY 213 (1978).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. William Grimes, Traveling from France to Harlem to Study Rap Culture at
its Roots, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 1991, at Cl, C12; DIETZ, supra note 146, at 224.
151. Fujitani, supra note 121, at 129-30.
152. DIEMZ, supra note 146, at 222.
153. Id. at 220.
154. See Fujitani, supra note 121, at 133.
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including those in France, England, and Germany.155
IV. THE INTERNET COMPARED TO CABLE TELEVISION, SATELLITE TELEVISION, AND THE Music INDUsTRY
A. The Similarities and Differences Between the Cable and
Satellite Television Industriesand the Internet, and an Evaluation of the Feasibilityof the Cable and Satellite Television Model for the Internet
There are many similarities among cable television, satellite television, and the Internet. Legislators contemplating
regulation of the Internet should examine how these other two
industries have effectively dealt with many of the same problems plaguing the Internet. The most important similarity between the cable and satellite television industries and the
Internet is that all three media share potentially huge transaction costs that would cripple all three industries if they were
required to negotiate agreements individually with single copyright holders. In this respect, a compulsory licensing scheme
that eliminated the need for individual negotiations and had
pre-set royalty fees would benefit the Internet's viability as a
medium just as it has benefited the cable and satellite television industries. 5 '
The need for an Internet regulatory model that limits
transaction costs as much as possible is heightened by the fact
that the Internet carries a much more diverse array of material than either the cable or satellite television industries. The
Internet can carry any type of copyrighted material including,
but certainly not limited to, computer programs, books, music,
movies, games, works of art, photographs, and newsletters. In
contrast, cable and satellite systems carry much less varied
information. For instance, it is both unlikely and impractical
for the complete text of a book to be beamed by satellite technology or cable signals. The fact the Internet carries such a
diverse array of copyrighted materials means that it faces even
higher transaction costs than those media that are not so diverse, and further illustrates the need for a regulatory model

155. Thomas J. Cryan et al., Radio for the 1990s: Legal Strategies in an
Emerging Global Marketplace, 22 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 377, 402 (1991).
156. For a more detailed description of this type of regulation, see discussion

supra Part HIA.
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that limits transaction costs as much as possible.
A further similarity among the three media is that anticompetitive problems, comparable to those faced in the player
piano industry,'57 could plague the Internet BBS system if
copyright holders could "hold out for the highest bidder" and
demand outrageous royalty payments.' Not only would this
increase transaction costs dramatically, it would ensure that
only a few of the large commercial service providers like
CompuServe, Prodigy, and America Online would be able to
survive copyright bidding wars. These services could then effectively establish a monopoly on the industry and charge their
subscribers exorbitant prices for access to the Internet, since
there would be only a few service providers. If the number of
Internet users continues to grow as expected,' almost unimaginable sums of money would be at stake. A monopoly
could also serve as an incentive for renegade BBS's not to seek
permission and just upload copyrighted material onto their

157. See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
158. This scenario is similar to what has happened in other industries. For
example, sports bar owners, although willing to pay for the right to broadcast
copyrighted sports broadcasts from professional sports leagues such as Major
League Baseball (MLB), the National Football League (NFL), and the National
Basketball Association (NBA), could not afford the exorbitant royalty fees demanded by the leagues. Cote, supra note 80, at 219-20. These huge fees are due in
large part to the sporting event's marketplace, which is comprised of television
networks worth millions of dollars, and television superstations like ESPN, WTBS,
and WGN that can out-maneuver and out-resource even the most lucrative of
restaurant chains. See, e.g., Leonard Shapiro, Owners Cash In, Carry NFL to New
Home, WASH. PosT, Dec. 19, 1993, at D9 (describing NFL-Fox deal worth $1.6
billion dollars); Mark Maske, Numbers Translate to Losses: Each Day of Strike
Costs Both Sides, WASH. PosT, Aug. 21, 1994, at D1 (reporting that because of a
player strike, MLB lost $140 million dollars in fees for broadcasting); Chicago
Professional Sports Ltd. Partnership v. NBA, 961 F.2d 667, 669 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 506 U.S. 954 (1992) (discussing the amount paid to the NBA for television
coverage); Jerome Holtzman, Vincent Tries Some Tenderness, Seeks Middle Ground
in Superstation Dilemma, CH. TRIB., June 21, 1992, § 3, at 5 (reporting on Major
League Baseball's multi-million dollar contracts with television superstations).
Congress, in turn, proposed the compulsory license as a way of balancing the
interests of copyright owners, sports bar owners, and viewers. See Right to View
Professional Sports Act of 1993, H.R. 1988, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). This bill
never made it out of Committee, however. A virtually identical bill was proposed
in 1995, but this version never made it out of Committee either. See Right to
View Professional Sports Act of 1995, H.R. 935, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
159. Major growth in users is expected both internationally as well as nationally. In 1994, it was estimated that the Internet had approximately 25 million
users in 135 countries, and that this number was growing at a rate of 10% to
15% a month. Lewis, supra note 3, § 3, at 6.
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services because they could not afford the royalties demanded.
If the goal is to stop, or at least curb, copyright infringement
along the Internet, a regulatory scheme which allowed bidding
wars would not be effective. On the other hand, a system like
the compulsory licensing system used in the cable and satellite
television industries would prevent bidding wars, would keep
prices from rising past their fair market value, and would
ensure that the public was continually able to access creative
materials.
Another similarity among the three media is that all three
present the potential for widespread and unauthorized reception. In fact, unauthorized reception is considered to be one of
the largest problems facing both the satellite and cable television industries today. Despite identification of the problem,
however, neither legislators nor industry leaders have been
able to deal effectively with the problem. Notwithstanding
national laws designed to prevent piracy and industry attempts at signal scrambling and coding, unlawful reception of
cable signals continues to persist. A British article reported in
1988 that "[pliracy of satellite television programmes is blatant
and could reach epidemic proportions... [,j costing film studios vast sums of money in lost royalties and depriving broadcasters of subscription revenue."160 The continued prevalence
of this problem stems from the fact that despite the laws, enforcement is difficult because it is hard to detect unauthorized
signal reception at the receiving end. 6 ' In addition, every
time signal providers find a new way to encode or scramble
their signals, new devices are developed that can decode and
descramble the industry's efforts.'62
On the issue of unauthorized reception, regulating the
Internet like the cable or satellite television industries would
be even more ineffective than it has proven to be in either of
the two other industries; it is even harder to detect unauthorized reception of copyrighted material along the Internet than
it is to detect unauthorized signal reception in either the cable
or satellite television industries. While people who illegally
intercept cable signals do not put a sign on the top of their
160. UK- BSB Criticises Satellite Pirates in Report, MARKETING WK., Sept. 8,
1988, at 15, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Arcnws File.
161. Id.
162. Id.
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house that tells the world they are infringing, satellite dishes
and cable wires can be visible outside of the home, and without
powerful and often extremely expensive equipment," people
cannot steal cable signals from halfway across the world as
they can relatively inexpensively tap into unauthorized databases containing copyrighted material that are physically located even further away. Furthermore, encryption devices and
coding methods are no longer widely used on computer
software.' A regulatory scheme attempting to draw on the
experiences of both the cable and satellite television industries
must consider their lack of success in dealing with this unauthorized reception problem, and also must consider the added
dilemmas presented by the Internet's "covert" transmission."
Another similarity shared by cable television, satellite
television, and the Internet is the fact that all three media are
able to transcend national boundaries. Just as Internet messages can be sent from Finland to France and on to England in
a matter of seconds, so too can broadcast signals. Both cable
television and satellite television are governed nationally by a
central authority in each respective country, while the Internet
today has no central overseer whatsoever. While this Note
argues that a central authority is necessary to regulate the
Internet, national regulation is not the answer. National regulation creates a basis for additional transaction costs166 and
would be ineffectual for the Internet because it is often impossible to trace the route of Internet-disseminated materials,
thus making choice-of-law issues virtually impossible to determine. 6 ' This Note argues that the Internet should be governed
by an international, rather than a national, regulatory scheme.

163. Although the equipment is still not accessible to the average person, the
costs are decreasing.
164. For the reasons behind the lack of encryption devices on computer software, see supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
165. For a proposal that attempts to grapple with the cable and satellite television industries' lack of success in dealing with this issue, see infra Part V.
166. National regulation adds transaction costs because the signal carrier has
to ensure that he has permission to broadcast the signals into every country
where his signal will be received. See generally Competition: UK-Irish Broadcasting
Agreements Set to be Cleared, EUiR REPORT, Apr. 21, 1993, available in Westlaw,
Allnewsplus Database.
167. For a full discussion of choice-of-law issues plaguing the Internet, see
supra notes 27-36 and accompanying text.

1996]

INTERNET COPYRIGHT PROTECTION

429

An important difference, which could prove to be prohibitive if nations are unwilling to formulate copyright laws whose
definitions truly reflect the realities of the Internet, is that
cable television programs can be "used" under current copyright definitions while Internet materials cannot. This means
that cable programs can be licensed and Internet materials
would not be eligible for licensing unless the definition of "use"
can be changed." Although there still exists a risk that users may become copiers by videotaping a program for more
than a transitory period of time,'69 this is not an issue with
which the cable television or satellite systems or their royalty
remuneration schemes must concern themselves.
B. The Similaritiesand Differences Between the Music Industry and the Internet and an Evaluation of the Feasibilityof the
Music Industry Model of Regulation for the Internet
In addition to examining the cable television and satellite
television industries as examples of copyright regulation models, legislators should also examine the similarities between
the music industry and the Internet. One important similarity
between the music industry model and the Internet is the
problem created by prohibitive transaction costs in both media.'
In the music industry, copyright collection societies
formed early in the twentieth century to make it easier for
potential licensees to deal with copyright holders. Instead of
negotiating individually with each right holder, a licensee
merely had to contact one of two copyright collection societies
and pay the royalty. The Internet would benefit significantly
from the idea of the royalty collection system because it would
eliminate the need for BBS's to deal with individual copyright
holders.
In order for the music industry to be used as a model for
Internet regulation, however, a few important operational
differences between the music industry and the Internet must

168. For a full discussion of the term "use," see supra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
169. See Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417
(1984) (holding that mere time-shifing does not constitute copyright infringement
as it is considered only transitory).
170. This similarity is also shared by the cable and satellite television industries. See discussion supra Part III.A.1-.2.
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be acknowledged. The Internet has the potential to carry any
type of copyrighted material in its digitized form. On the other
hand, the music industry only has to regulate the non-dramatic performing rights in musical compositions, yet the system is
still racked by serious collection problems. Furthermore, individual performing rights societies exist in every nation in the
music industry. This aspect of the music industry model would
not be feasible for the Internet. There would be too many societies with which potential licensees would have to deal in the
various countries. The royalty collection society system in the
music industry has enough difficulty handling national performing rights 7 ' and foreign reciprocal collection agreements.
These problems would be magnified at least tenfold in a system where each nation had its own collection society for every
possible type of copyrightable medium.'72 Transaction costs,
although significantly less than they would be if it were necessary to negotiate individually with copyright holders, would
still be prohibitive. Collection would be both inefficient and
ineffective system-wide. In order for a royalty collection society
system to work effectively for the global Internet, there must
be fewer societies and they must be global in nature.
Another feature of the music industry model that could
prove beneficial to the Internet model is the fact that royalty
fees in the music industry are not statutorily set and are not
paid into a royalty tribunal. The fees are set by the collecting
societies at "reasonable rates," subject to judicial review by the
courts, and the collecting societies actually collect the money
from the licensees. This type of system could work well with a
private, for-profit international regulatory regime that is not
run by a governmental organization.
A significant difference between the music industry and
the Internet must be noted. In the music industry, when a

171. Compliance by establishments open to the public with the licensing system
in the United States for performing rights in music has been described as "grudging at best." Litman, supra note 10, at 49.
172. For example, "[elach year, an unspecified amount of foreign royalties attributable to American songs are routinely detained for months or years in foreign
coffers due to improper crediting, nonreciprocal laws, negligence, and incompetence." William I. Hochberg, Fishing in the Black Box Developments in International Music Royalty Collecting, 26 BEvERLY HILLS B. ASS'N J. 114 (1992). Indeed, "a
surprising amount of royalty income never makes it stateside, due not only to
insidious piracy but also to insidious bureaucracy." Id.
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licensed song is played with permission of the copyright holder,
the song is performed "in public." This means that the performance is out in the open and capable of being heard by more
people than just the permission holder. Performing Rights
Societies in the music industry can attempt to monitor "public
performances" of copyrighted material through random sampling and then estimate national levels so that they can remunerate their copyright holders accordingly. 17 However, it
would be close to impossible to try and monitor actual or even
approximate "use" of copyrighted material on the Internet. It is
thus not feasible for Internet monitors to attempt to judge
uploading and downloading of copyrighted material based upon
the music industry's random sampling or any other such
mechanism. Instead, unlike the music industry model, a method of remuneration that is not contingent upon actual "use"
must be established for the Internet.
V. THE PROPOSED REGIME

This section proposes how a hybrid 74 system could work
in light of the analysis of the similarities and differences
among cable television, satellite television, and the Internet.
On-line networks will negotiate with international copyright
collection societies for the right to "use" copyrighted work as
part of a licensing agreement. This negotiation will reduce the
transaction costs of national collection societies acting as
agents for foreign societies abroad, collecting royalties for those
societies, and then ensuring that the foreign society gets paid
the correct amount in a timely fashion. The BBS's will pay
royalties to these international copyright societies based upon
the number of subscribers that they have on their on-line system, and not based upon the number who actually download
the material. 7 Network subscribers can transitorily place
173. For a discussion of performing rights societies, see supra Part Il.B.
174. This model is considered "hybrid" because it combines elements from both
the compulsory licensing cable and satellite television models and the music industry model.
175. This scheme would work well because we no longer have to try and monitor who is downloading what and how many times a work has been downloaded
from a network. Since every person who accesses the Internet does so through
some type of network, all users could theoretically be accounted for under this
type of regime. Of course, this scheme would not prevent tiny, unknown networks
from escaping detection and not paying royalties based upon the number of sub-
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the material in the RAM of their computers, 7 ' but in the absence of a separate agreement, they would not be able to print,
distribute, lend, or transfer the material without violating the
holder's copyright. Since everyone must access the Internet
through some type of bulletin board subscription agreement,
theoretically, no Internet user would be unaccounted for in this
scheme and there would be a marked shift in focus from the
information receivers to the information providers. 77 Every
BBS would be responsible for paying royalty fees to copyright
collection societies based upon its number of subscribers and
the type of licensing agreement that they established with the
collection societies. 7" "Blanket licenses" would be given based
upon a percentage of gross receipts and per-work licenses
would be granted at a predetermined fair market value, depending upon public demand. These collection societies would
also play the role of policemen.'79 They would employ people

scribers that they have, nor does it ensure that every network pays for every
copyrighted work that it has on its system, but these are operational problems
that should not step the development of the regime. Besides, if the industry were
to make it profitable for people to be "Internet Policers" and make their living
logging on to the Internet, and to ensure that all works disseminated on a network were properly licensed and paid for (like the watchdogs at BMI and ASCAP),
these types of operational problems would not pose great threats to the system.
176. This licensing model does not deal with the ability of an end-user to print
out and/or distribute the material that is accessed through the Internet.
177. This scheme would theoretically eliminate the problem of unauthorized
reception of copyrighted material at the receiving end that plagues both the cable
and satellite television industries. See supra text accompanying notes 95-96, 10610. The problem would theoretically be eliminated in regard to the receivers
(downloaders) because the only copyrighted material available to them would be
material that had been licensed to the BBS. This scheme would not prevent
Internet users from uploading copyrighted material that had not been previously
licensed to their BBS, but the "Internet Policers," see supra note 175, would monitor this type of activity, and the BBS itself would take steps to prevent this from
happening because it would face stiff fines if it were found to be in violation of
the regulations.
178. This includes corporate networks, even though corporate employees do not
pay a subscriber's fee to the corporation. For corporate networks, corporations
would pay some predetermined percentage of gross profits.
179. This policing could work as it does with the Software Publishers Association (SPA). The SPA is a group founded by numerous publishers of software whose
intent is to fight software piracy. The SPA polices BBS's to see if copyrighted software is being distributed. SPA officials also warn SYSOPS that they will be monitoring their BBS's, and give them the chance to remove any and all software that
they have not been given permission to distribute. Violators are required to remove all illegal software and pay a fine equal to the purchase price of that software. If the violators comply with the SPA requirements, they are spared the
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to explore the numerous BBS's and seek out instances of infringement. This will be expensive and time-consuming work,
but will be especially worthwhile given the large sums of money at stake and the fact that the collection societies are profiting from this venture. The monitoring would differ from BMI
or ASCAP's monitoring because the Internet monitors would
not care how many subscribers were downloading particular
copyrighted works. The actual number of downloads is irrelevant according to this model. The monitors would be searching
only for instances in which a BBS had not paid a licensing fee,
yet had uploaded copyrighted works or was allowing its subscribers to upload copyrighted materials. Although this type of
endeavor would not be completely effective because of the vastness of the Internet and the numerous other difficulties associated with the medium, 8 ' it would reduce substantially the
amount of infringement that occurs today.
Collection societies would work, in theory, on the basis of a
pseudo-compulsory license,'' but the license would not be a
government-instituted compulsory license,"' nor would it
have statutorily set royalty fees that were below market value
like the cable television industry. This model envisions private,

inconvenience of a lawsuit. If not, violators can expect swift legal action against
them. Janet Mason, Crackdown on Software Pirates: Industry Watchdog Renew
Efforts to Curb Illegal Copying, COMPUTERWORLD, Feb. 5, 1990, at 107, 111, 113,
115. It has been suggested that the software industry employ "bounty hunters"
recruited from the ranks of former pirates to seek out and turn in their former
cohorts, and receive remuneration based upon the number of convictions of software pirating groups and/or individuals or the damages recovered. See Bauman,
supra note 68, at A18.
180. "No one is naive enough to believe that copyright infringement can be
eradicated from the Internet." Rich, supra note 30, at 10 (quoting Ed Morin, head
of Novell's anti-piracy team).
181. I say "in theory" because it would only be a compulsory license in that
neither the societies nor the copyright holders would have the right to refuse to
grant a license to a potential licensee.
182. The compulsory licenses cannot be statutorily fixed by governments because according to the Berne Convention:
It shall be a matter for legislation in the countries of the Union to determine the conditions under which [exclusive] rights may be exercised, but
these conditions shall apply only in the countries where they have been
prescribed. They shall not in any circumstances be prejudicial to the
moral rights of the author, nor to his right to obtain equitable remuneration which, in the absence of agreement, shall be fixed by competent authority.
Berne Convention, supra note 15, art. llbis(2), S. TREATY DOC. No. 27, at 8, 828
U.N.T.S. at 243.
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for-profit corporations operating these international collection
societies. Copyright holders in all media around the world
would turn their works over to these private international
copyright collection societies. This model contemplates only a
few societies in each medium to keep transaction costs as low
as possible."8 The collection societies would then "license"
the "use" of these materials on the Internet to networks and
BBS's. For networks and BBS's, the system would be "convenient, affordable, and democratic.""8 From the right holder's
perspective, the system of compensation would be efficient,
include some veto power, and permit the maximum revenue
l

flow. 18

The best way to effectuate this system would be for nations around the world to execute an international Internet
copyright treaty'8 6 that would provide the foundation for the
international licensing regime and garner the consent and
compliance of the participating nations.'87 Under the auspices
of this treaty, a multi-function administrative agency 1" must
be organized to preside over the operation. The regime overseer would be comprised of market insiders and experts from
around the world, who would conduct extensive research in
order to determine the correct "fair market values" 89 for the
predetermined royalty rates. Disputes between licensees and
collection societies or copyright holders and licensees would be
brought before the regime overseer for resolution. A royalty
183. One society in each medium, although it certainly would cut down on
transaction costs, would give rise to cries of monopolies and antitrust violations.
Competition among a few collection societies will drive down licensing fees, even
when collectives issue blanket licenses. See Stanley M. Besen et a]., An Economic
Analysis of Copyright Collectives, 78 VA. L. REV. 383, 383 (1992).
184. Raymond L. Ocampo, Jr. & David R. Schellhase, The Multimedia Marketplace: A Proposal for Handling Rights in the Digital Age, 14 CAL. LAW. 70, 72
(1994).
185. Id.
186. Instead of trying to institute this regime through an already-existing treaty (i.e., the Berne Convention or the Universal Copyright Convention), it is necessary that a new treaty be used. A treaty originally designed to govern works in
print will not be effective for this new technology. For the reason behind this, see
supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
187. Garnering the consent and compliance of the participating nations is essential if this model is to succeed.
188. This administrative agency (or "regime overseer") would also serve as a review/disciplinary board.
189. A portion of the "fair market value" is the fee that royalty collection societies are entitled to charge under this regime.
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collection society operating in violation of the treaty
provisions" would be subject to disciplinary measures. 9 '
These disciplinary measures would be determined by the regime overseer. Copyright infringers 92 would also be subject
to disciplinary proceedings promulgated under the authority of
the regime overseer if they were caught violating the copyright
regime.
VI. CONCLUSION
Although this model of regulation, combining individual
aspects of the cable television, the satellite television, and the
music industry models of regulation will not put an end to
copyright infringement on the Internet, it will at least provide
a viable model and a workable balance between providing for
the economic rights of copyright holders and decreasing the
prohibitive transaction costs that would be involved if on-line
networks were forced to negotiate individually with copyright
owners. This type of regulation may prevent some individual
copyright holders from negotiating large royalty contracts with
potential licensees, but at least the system will ensure that
copyright holders receive some compensation for their works.
As the Internet operates today, those same individual copyright holders may get nothing while their works are widely
disseminated along the Internet. This system will substantially
reduce the amount of copyright infringement occurring under
the current regime, and it will also uphold one of the main
purposes of copyright law, which is to ensure that society as a
whole continues to have access to a wide variety of creative
endeavors at a relatively low cost.' 93
BarbaraCohen

190. A collection society could violate the regime by refusing to deal with a
potential licensee, charging rates above the pre-set "fair market value rates," etc.
191. Examples of disciplinary measures that could be imposed would be fines,
injunctions, or a loss of permission to operate within the regime.
192. Under this model, copyright infringers are those BBS's who either upload
copyrighted works onto their networks without first obtaining a license from one of
the international licensing societies, or BBS's who allow any of their subscribers to
upload such material.
193. See supra notes 13-16 and accompanying text.

